Showing posts with label profession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label profession. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

When Less is More in Healthcare Spending: The "Region of Reverse Command"

A letter [30-Apr-2012] to an administrator inside "Healthcare Improvement".
It is related to a previous post: The Unnoticed Crisis in Healthcare.





I was hoping you could tell me if there have been any discussions amongst Healthcare Professionals about an effect known in Aviation as "Region of Reverse Command" or "being behind the power curve".

Hospital Blame Game: Fixable or Just Not Possible?

A reaction to an ABC report on 10% budget cuts in Victorian hospitals.

"Federal and State governments in hospital cuts blame game"
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2013/s3688997.htm

There are 3 systems effects that as yet have been ignored by Hospital Administrators and Politicians:
  • "stitch in time" funding to avoid increasing total costs by over-waiting
  • reduce budgets by dropping the least vital work. "cut floors, not corners"
  • "Don't throw good money after bad", reduce spending where patient lifestyle affects outcomes and they won't change.

Monday, August 20, 2012

Quote from signatory to US Declaration of Independence: Medical Freedom is Right

This quote was pointed out to me. I think it's a stunner, especially considering the age of the original: 230yrs, 100yrs since Booth and its another 15+yrs since Wilk...

There is also an interesting counter quotation from Dr Benjamin Rush, a physician and signatory to the U.S. Declaration of Independence [1776]. 
He wrote, "The Constitution of the Republic should make provision for medical freedom. To restrict the art of healing to one class of men and deny equal privilege to others will constitute the Bastille of medical science. All such laws are un-American and despotic. They are vestiges of monarchy and have no place in a republic. " 
Wilk CA. Medicine, monopolies and malice.New York: Avery Publishing Group 1996;53.
and
ER Booth, History of Osteopathy and Twentieth Century Medical Practice, Cincinnati: Caxton Press, 1905 (1924):312.

Saturday, August 11, 2012

The Professional Mandate: Don't repeat Known Mistakes, yours or anyone else's.

[Full post on other blog.]

My formulation of the Professional mandate:
It's "unprofessional" to repeat or allow, Known Faults, Failures and Errors.
That sounds complete, perhaps obvious, but let me unpack this some more...

Thursday, August 9, 2012

ISM/FoSiM: "Inversion" - Putting the Cart before the Horse in Healthcare Reform

One of the amazing arrogances and Blindspots of the fanatics and zealots of ISM and their "mini-me", FoSiM, is they've got the Healthcare Reform debate turned around completely. Colloquially, they've put the cart before the horse.

The FoSiM "Vision Statement" in their recruiting letter was:
"To reverse the current trend which sees government-funded tertiary institutions offering health care ‘science’ courses not based on scientific principles nor supported by scientific evidence”.
And from the ISM Policy paper on Regulation and Licensing all Healthcare Practitioners and Training:
As a consequence of these practitioners being legitimized through political rather than scientific means, the health of people worldwide has been put at significant risk.
Not hard to spot that both these statements aren't backed by any Evidence, any Theory but only Absolutist Assertion: it shows from the start that this is only Ideological based, not based in fact or need, nor indeed arrived at by any valid, credible process.

The "Inversion" of ISM/FoSiM is who they put at the centre of their Healthcare Reform proposal in their call for more "Science in Medicine", ignoring their one-eyed bias where they never examine the Practice or Science of their own, Medical Care.

ISM/FoSiM put "Science" at the centre of their Reform proposal and agenda.
Specifically, 'Science' applies to:
  • Practitioners,
  • Specialities,
  • Organisations,
  • Research, Academic or Commercial,
  • Professional Bodies,
  • Professions, and
  • Governance bodies and processes, such as defined by Government Agencies.
What's completely missing is The Patient. This is the Inversion. It's Practitioner- and Profession-centric, not Patient-centric.

This is the Big Lie, the massive horn-swoggle that ISM/FoSiM are attempting to pull off:
The Patient, their Outcomes, the Quality of their Care and their Safety under Medical Care is completely absent. And most importantly, Patient Accessibility and Affordability are missing.
ISM/FoSiM want to "Fix All Ills of Healthcare and its Systems" through More Science, amusingly without evidence that this can or will help. The evidence of the last sixty years of "More Science" in Medical Care is that costs rise astronomically (5% to 18% of GDP in the USA), while more people are untreated and Public Health outcomes do not seem commensurate change.

The ISM/FoSiM advocacy for more "Science in Medicine", even taken at face value, is a clear call for:
Better Healthcare!
Which is admirable in its intent.

Only, like all their efforts, it's vague, incomplete and unfocussed. It's posturing not a useful addition to the debate.

They are advocating for Better Healthcare:
  • For Whom?
  • Where?
  • How Measured?
  • Within what Cost and Resource envelope?
  • But mainly, How can their Reforms be delivered and Implmentation executed when the current Medical Care system is grossly understaffed, inefficient and already too expensive for ordinary folk?
More "Science" won't deliver Better Medical Care, it can only deliver more expensive, less accessible and less effective care, and further stress already over-worked and failing individuals and organisations.

"More Science" does involve more money for research, more expensive devices, drugs, equipment and services and, for the very few that can afford it, much more expensive interventions ("Rescue Care") for extreme conditions. It's a Bonanza for everyone making money out of the process, the Companies, Practitioners and Researchers, and a FAIL for everyone else: the Patients, the Healthcare workers and the Governments funding it.

The only group of Patients, the only reason this field of work exists at all, who might benefit aren't just the "Top 1%", but probably the "Top 0.1%".

This is a proposal that will cost a whole bunch of money, mostly Public (ISM/FoSiM are universally silent on Cost and Efficiency Improvement) and the two groups to benefit are: themselves and their rich mates.

That's a really interesting proposal for spending piles of Public Money with no sense of Accountability and where the only evidence available is "It won't help, but will cost a whole lot more."

How does "More Science" equate to "Better Healthcare"?
Not in the Real World and not at all for Ordinary People who'll be paying for it... 
This is a scheme dreamed up by the privileged, for the privileged, of the the privileged.



If you'd like to know what Better Healthcare looks like, here's the definitive guide, with actual research references:
"Managing Clinical Processes: Doing Good by Doing Well" by Dr Brent James.
What do we get for all that money? [slide 16]
  1. High touch -- patients value their relationship with a trusted clinical advisor more than any other element in health care delivery (the clinician-patient relationship)
  2. Rapid response -- the Rule of Rescue
Three classes of outcomes: [slide 65]
  • Physical outcomes
    • medical outcomes: complications and therapeutic goals
    • includes functional status measures (patient perceptions of medical outcomes)
  • Service outcomes
    • satisfaction: patients and families, communities, professionals, purchasers, and employees
    • includes access issues (e.g., waiting times)
  • Cost outcomes
    • just another outcome of a clinical process
    • includes the cost of the burden of disease
Medical outcomes are of four types: [slide 66]
  • appropriateness
    • (referral and procedure indications)
  • complications
    • (process failures / defects)
  • therapeutic goals / biologic function
    • (when stated in the negative, merges with defects)
  • the patient's ability to function
    • (functional status, as reported by the patient)
  • are process specific
    •  (different clinical conditions have different complications, different therapeutic goals, functional status measures)
  • Medical outcomes relate directly to health care costs
Service outcomes are of two types: [slide 67]
  • the clinician-patient relationship
    • (bedside manner: a "caring and concerned" clinician)
  • access issues: convenience vs. hassle
    • (scheduling, travel times, registration, physical comfort, wait times, etc.)
  • operate by a separate, general process that is independent of medical outcomes
  • Service outcomes directly affect market share, community perceptions and relations (that is, prestige and social status), and
  •  rates of malpractice law suits
Health care consumers seek value [slide 69]
  • Value = (Medical outcomes + Service outcomes) ÷ Cost outcomes
  • The goal is the best possible medical outcomes at the lowest necessary cost
It'd be interesting if ISM/FoSiM ever apply their considerable talent and resource to addressing just how their call for "More Science" will deliver better Healthcare outcomes in the structure given by DR James.

Sunday, August 5, 2012

ISM/FoSiM: The irrelevance of more "Science" in Healthcare Reform

ISM (Institute of Science in Medicine) and their Australian "mini-me", FoSiM (Friends of Science in Medicine), are advocating a rather extreme version of Healthcare reform:
Medicalisation of all Healthcare, under the guise of advancing "Science in Medicine".
These extreme views are published in an ISM Policy paper on the Licensing of non-Medical Healthcare practitioners. They advocate changing world-wide statues/regulation to only allow "science-based" Healthcare (code for Only Medical Care) and finish with:
Unscientific practices in health care should further be targets of aggressive prosecution by regulatory authorities. [italics added]
They don't just want to wind the clock back to The Grand Old Days of the Fifties, but a whole Century. The authority they cite is the 1910 Carnegie Foundation report on Medical Education by Flexner.

Flexner tossed around a bunch of concepts, many more than the State Regulation of Medicine and Medical Schools on which ISM/FoSiM base their calls for increased Healthcare Regulation, a.k.a. "Science in Medicine", as the definitive solution to all the ills of all Healthcare Systems in the world.

In the second half of this piece, Flexner's original thesis and concepts are examined - and not wholly surprisingly they support the opposite position of ISM/FoSiM.

Firstly, What do the world's best experts in Healthcare Reform identify as the local and/or common challenges to Healthcare?

And, How do the proposals of ISM/FoSiM address these Medical Millennium Challenges?

Dr Brent James, executive director of Research and Quality at Intermountain HealthCare, Utah, (IHI) has extensively published hard data on Quality Improvement in Medicine, won prestigious Quality and Medical awards and co-authored landmark works on Patient Safety, Quality of Care and delivery of Best Practice Medicine. After 3 decades of implementing and executing successful reform programs at IHI, Dr James easily qualifies as one of the experts on Healthcare Reform.

Dr James, in his initial slides for his Advanced Training Program, ["Managing Clinical Processes: Doing Well by Doing Good"], lays out a lot of diverse material that underpins his Quality Improvement methodology and forms a consistent, well-formed theory driving his decades of successful Reform, not like ISM/FoSiM, a set of untested Ideological assertions.

On Slide 9, "Total health: How long, how well we live", Dr James lays out what the Evidence says on the contributors to Good Health. They are:
  • 40% - Behaviour under control of the Individual (loosely, 'lifestyle choices'). Tobacco, Alcohol, Movement Deficit Disorder [humour!]
  • 30% - Genetics
  • 20% - Environment and Public Health
  • 10% - Health care Delivery (Hospitals and Clinics)
On the next slide (10), "The Great Equation", he states [with sources cited]:
  • Health = medical care and medical care = "access to care"
  • "But the Great Equation is wrong ..."
And then goes into a lot of detail about why that is so.

In slide 29, "Dr. John Wennberg", he describes Wennberg's research/analysis:
  • Geography is destiny ("Who you see is what you get")
  • There is no health care "system"
  • Supplier-induced demand: [many examples follow]
In slide 31, "Care-associated injuries in hospitals", Dr James describes one of the primary source of waste in Medical care, which he addressed at IHI, providing net savings of 20-32% in delivering services. Not to mention much better Patient outcomes.
  • Injuries drive direct health care costs totalling $9 - 15 billion per year [Thomas et al. 1999, Johnson et al. 1992]
Dr James is also quoted in a forum organised by his University, PANEL ON HEALTH CARE REFORM – FALL 2008, Continuum, Utah University.

This is what he has to say on the Challenges facing Healthcare around the world:
JAMES: Another point is that we’re getting exactly what we pay for. We tend to pay for procedures and rescue care, so we get lots of procedures and lots of rescue care. This is a key factor.
Another thing you need to know is that other countries have exactly the same problems. So don’t look for solutions in Europe. Don’t look for solutions in Canada.
I get a ton of those guys coming through visiting to see how care’s delivered in Utah, believe it or not, because they face exactly the same problems.
There’s a standard working list of the top five problems within health care, and nobody’s solved them.
Travel the world and it’s the same list of five things:
1. The first problem is variation in care on a geographic basis.
It’s so high that it’s impossible that all Americans are getting good care, even with full access.
2. The second biggest problem is high rates of care directly judged to be inappropriate.
This is where the medical risk treatment outweighed any potential benefit to the patient and we did it anyway . . . usually in a rescue setting.
3. The third problem is unacceptable rates of care-associated injury and death.
This is where the care delivered actively killed somebody, whose death was judged to be preventable upon review.
4. The fourth problem is that the system does it right only 55 percent of the time.
There are things that we know for a fact should be done every time but the system does right only 55 percent of the time.
Now, that’s better than zero, but it’s not nearly 95 percent or 98 percent, where it ought to be.
5. And the last one is that there’s at least 50 percent waste in the system.
This is non- value-adding from a patient’s perspective, and that’s where the opportunity exists.

Conclusion:

From the hard-data evidence presented by Dr James based on more than 3 decades of successful Healthcare Reform, we know:
  • The ISM/FoSiM proposals address the least important, least useful areas of change. 
  • Addressing Lifestyle Issues and Environment/Public Health would have six times the impact of attempting to improve "Health Care Delivery" through more "Science".  
    • Even then, ISM/FoSiM are either vague or silent on just what benefits their proposals, if adopted, can deliver. If they want to turn Healthcare around the world inside out, with considerable disruption, cost and upheaval, then they need to first inform us of the exact benefits we can expect.
  • The ISM/FoSiM proposals are irrelevant to the common "Top 5" Challenges faced by Healthcare Systems around the world: None benefit from more "Science", they are all about Quality of Care and Effectiveness of Delivery and Implementation.
  • All successful and effective Healthcare Reform, since and including Flexner, has been Patient-centric. The ISM/FoSiM proposals aren't just wrong, but exactly the opposite of what is documented to have worked. Practitioner- and Profession-centric reforms, such as "More Science in Medicine" do not deliver better outcomes for Patients.
ISM/FoSiM consistently demand high-quality Evidence and rigorous Science from those in its sights, yet fail to apply the Scientific Method and their Rules of Evidence to their own proposals and assertions.

To be consistent and credible, ISM/FoSiM must:
  • Meet the same standards of "Evidence", Research and adherence to the Scientific Method as they demand of others.
  • Demonstrate and Quantify how more "Science" will improve Quality of Care, Patient Safety, Equity of Access and Systemic Waste and Cost-Effectiveness issues identified as "Top 5" Healthcare Reform Challenges by the leading experts in the field.
  • First define their own "Top 5" Healthcare Challenges, and
  • provide research backed by verifiable, hard-data on the Efficacy of their own proposals, their own favourite criticism of non-Medical Healthcare.
If ISM/FoSiM criticise the Effectiveness of non-Medical Healthcare, we must in turn ask them to demonstrate the Effectiveness of their own proposals. If they set Rules and Standards for others, they need to follow them themselves, even better, demonstrate by superior example.



The Flexner report doesn't just say "Regulation and Licensing is necessary" as ISM/FoSiM seems to think, it also says many things still relevant today:
  • it asks for common standards and basic clinical education with laboratory practice,
  • suggests the 'Best Practices' as used by the Europeans,
  • says that Medicine is a Performance Discipline [my words] - that Theory and Practice/Experience together are needed by competent Professionals ("Head and Hands"),
  • that Medicine is not primarily a commercial enterprise, but has a very large "Public Service" component, with a Duty of Care not just to individuals treated, but the larger Community,
  • and explicitly recognises "all medical sects", and they be based on good clinical education.
It also contains an implicit commentary that demands:
  • As part of good Professional conduct, the systematic elimination of Known Errors, Faults and Failures, ("To Err is Human", but repeating preventable mistakes is malpractice of the highest order) and
  • From the Flexner principle of "licenses bear a uniform value":
    • Continuing certification retesting of all license holders, not a lifetime grant of license.
    • the adoption of practices that have been demonstrated to have value in assuring Professional competence and skills/knowledge currency at every point in time for all license holders. From Aviation, we know these techniques work:
      • Frequent (2 monthly) "Check Pilot" assessment of the in-situ performance of every Practitioner,
      • Simulator checks of "worst-case" situations. (Quarterly)
Why would we expect Medicine to have lower Quality and Practitioner Certification standards and processes than other fields? Heatlhcare should be the leader in Practice Efficacy, Quality, Safety and Cost-Effectiveness.

Flexner and the Carnegie Foundation were critical of the medical profession, its standards and ethics of practice: what we'd now call 'governance'.

They also called for the general public to be trained in assessing doctors and requiring professional practice from them. Something not included in the ISM/FoSiM proposals.

The report also emphasises that all medical professions owe a Duty of Care to their patients which requires much higher standards that other work:
it is a 'public service' on which people trust their lives, not merely a business.
Today, Flexner and the Carnegie Foundation might phrase their argument in terms of "Quality of Care", "Patient Safety" and whole system effectiveness, not just single element "efficacy".
By professional patriotism amongst medical men I mean that sort of regard for the honor of the profession and that sense of responsibility for its efficiency which will enable a member of that profession to rise above the consideration of personal or of professional gain.
As Bacon truly wrote, "Every man owes a duty to his profession," and in no profession is this obligation more clear than in that of the modern physician.
Perhaps in no other of the great professions does one find greater discrepancies between the ideals of those who represent it.
The interests of the general public have been so generally lost sight of in this matter that the public has in large measure forgot that it has any interests to protect.
Flexner notes the importance of the basic Professional Charter: It's professional malpractice to repeat or allow, Known Errors, Faults and Failures.
"There the Clinical professor comes in to the Aid of Speculation and demonstrates the Truth of Theory by Facts,"
he declared in words that a century and a half later still warrant repetition;
"he meets his pupils at stated times in the Hospital, and when a case presents adapted to his purpose,
he asks all those Questions which lead to a certain knowledge of the Disease and parts Affected;
and if the Disease baffles the power of Art and the Patient falls a Sacrifice to it,
he then brings his Knowledge to the Test,
and fixes Honour or discredit on his Reputation by exposing all the Morbid parts to View,
and Demonstrates by what means it produced Death,
and if perchance he finds something unexpected,
which Betrays an Error in Judgement,
he like a great and good man immediately acknowledges the mistake,
and, for the benefit of survivors, points out other methods by which it might have been more happily treated."" [ An essay on The Utility of Clinical Lectures, by Thomas Bond, 1766.]
The writer of these sensible words fitly became our first professor of clinical medicine,1 with unobstructed access to the one hundred and thirty patients then in the hospital wards.
Flexner rather strongly states that "Medical Care" goes much further than treating diseases/conditions presented to the surgery, a position that would make him outside today's AMA:
The overwhelming importance of preventive medicine, sanitation, and public health indicates that in modern life the medical profession is an organ differentiated by society for its own highest purposes, not a business to be exploited by individuals according to their own fancy.
Flexner advocates for reform and states categorically the underlying drivers - that Patient-centric, not Practitioner- or Profession-centric solutions and specifically not intransigent Ideologies are required:
The public interest is then paramount, and when public interest, professional ideals, and sound educational procedure concur in the recommendation of the same policy, the time is surely ripe for decisive action.
Flexner specifically notes:
  • that mere Science, 'the instrumental basis of medical education', is woefully inadequate for a good Practitioner.
  • that physicians must be much more broadly trained and well-rounded individuals.
  • and they their education starts with their graduation, not finishes.
Just how was that to be done isn't said in that section. [Or at all?]

This non-disease view of Flexner and the Carnegie Foundation on Preventative Medicine and treating communities, not just individuals, is wildly at odds with the prevailing medical paradigm and the polemic of ISM/FoSiM...
The practitioner deals with facts of two categories.
Chemistry, physics, biology enable him to apprehend one set;
he needs a different apperceptive and appreciative apparatus to deal with other, more subtle elements.
Specific preparation is in this direction much more difficult;
one must rely for the requisite insight and sympathy on a varied and enlarging cultural experience.
Such enlargement of the physician's horizon is otherwise important, for scientific progress has greatly modified his ethical responsibility.
His relation was formerly to his patient - at most to his patient's family; and it was almost altogether remedial.
The patient had something the matter with him; the doctor was called in to cure it.
Payment of a fee ended the transaction.
But the physician's function is fast becoming social and preventive, rather than individual and curative.
Upon him society relies to ascertain, and through measures essentially educational to enforce, the conditions that prevent disease and make positively for physical and moral well-being.
It goes without saying that this type of doctor is first of all an educated man.
Flexner often uses the phrase "scientific medicine", but what did he mean?

This was 15 years before Karl Popper's theory of Falsifiability and more than 6 decades before the current notion of "Evidence Based Medicine" rose from the 1972 paper by Cochrane and Sacket's 1996 definition of the term.

Flexner left us a definition, even emphasising that arrogance and dogmatic insistence on "One Truth" is anathema to the Scientific Method:
The modern point of view may be restated as follows:
medicine is a discipline, in which the effort is made to use knowledge procured in various ways in order to effect certain practical ends. [italics added]
It is precisely the function of scientific method - in social life, politics, engineering, medicine - to get rid of such hindrances to clear thought and effective action.
Science believes slowly; in the absence of crucial demonstration its mien is humble, its hold is light. [italics added]
"One should not teach dogmas; on the contrary, every utterance must be put to the proof.
One should not train disciples but form observers: one must teach and work in the spirit of natural science." [Johannes Orth: Berliner Klinische Wochenschrift, vol.xliii. p.818]
Flexner lays out the philosophical basis of his recommended Medical Education system, based on the Scientific Method. He specifically addressed Education in "Medical Sects" (e.g. Homeopathy and Osteopathy) - as good a name as the ISM/FoSiM term "CAM" (Complementary and Alternative Medicine).

ISM/FoSiM don't just ignore that Universities now teach "CAM" courses according to Flexner's requirements, rather the reverse, they have called for the banning of exactly those courses.
The logical position of medical sectarians to-day is self-contradictory.
They have practically accepted the curriculum as it has been worked out on the scientific basis.
They teach pathology, bacteriology, clinical microscopy.
They are thereby committed to the scientific method ; for they aim to train the student to ascertain and interpret facts in the accepted scientific manner.
He may even learn his sciences in the same laboratory as the non-sectarian.
But scientific method cannot be limited to the first half of medical education.
The same method, the same attitude of mind, must consistently permeate the entire process.
To emphasise the point, Flexner wrote about acceptable education of non-Medical practitioners, defining objective tests based on process, not Ideology and preconception.

Substitute "Medical Sect" for "CAM" and Flexner defines for ISM/FoSiM the requirements that are now met by University courses:
Sectarians, in the logical sense above discussed, are
(1) the homeopathists,
(2) the eclectics,
(3) the physiomedicals,
(4) the osteopaths.
All of them accept in theory, at least, the same fundamental basis. 
They admit that anatomy, pathology, bacteriology, physiology, must form the foundation of a medical education, to use the words broadly so as to include all varieties of therapeutic procedure.
They offer no alternative to pathology or physiology; there is, they concede, only one proper science of the structure of the human body, of the abnormal growths that afflict it.
So far, they make no issue as against scientific medicine. [italics added]
Much is involved in agreement up to this point.
The standards of admission to the medical school, the facilities which the schools must furnish in order effectively to teach the fundamental branches, are the same for all alike.
A student of homeopathy or of osteopathy needs to be just as intelligent and mature as a student of scientific medicine;
and he is no easier to teach; for during the first and second years, at least, he is supposed to be doing precisely the same things.
At the beginning of the clinical years, the sectarian interposes his special principle.
But educationally, the conditions he needs thenceforth do not materially differ from those needed by consistently scientific medicine.
Once more, whatever the arbitrary peculiarity of the treatment to be followed,
the student cannot be trained to recognize clinical conditions,
to distinguish between different clinical conditions,
or to follow out a line of treatment,
except in the ways previously described in dealing with scientific medicine. [italics added]
He must see patients and must follow their progress, so as to discover what results take place in consequence of the specific measures employed.
A sectarian institution, being a school in which students are trained to do particular things, needs the same resources and facilities on the clinical side as a school of scientific medicine. [italics added]
Flexner showed, like ISM/FoSiM, an innate dislike for, and bias against "non-Medical" Healthcare Professions, but very clearly defined a set of Professional Principles that, if complied with, would him to accept the practice of any Medical Sect.

Instead of an authority against "CAM" as ISM/FoSiM suppose, Flexner definitively supports non-Medical Healthcare, if its Education process meets his requirements:
The law may require that all practitioners of the healing art comply with a rigidly enforced preliminary educational standard;
that every school possess the requisite facilities;
that every licensed physician demonstrate a practical knowledge of the body and its affections.
To these terms no reasonable person can object;
the good sense of society can enforce them upon reasonable and unreasonable alike.
From medical sects that can live on these conditions, the public will suffer little more harm than it is destined to suffer anyhow from the necessary incompleteness of human knowledge and the necessary defects of human skill.
On Medical Boards and Regulation, Flexner wrote they needed legislative power, and unlike ISM/FoSiM, did not conflate his report recommendations with the political lobbying needed to implement them. He also continues to underline the importance to the Profession of Public Duty.

There is another powerful, central principle of Flexner's: Medical Practitioners are not 'free agents', they first owe a duty of Public Service.
The power that validates the diploma with its license must have the strength to protect its issues against either debasement or infringement.
The physician, like the lawyer, is an agent of the state. [italics added]
If he proves unworthy, the same board that vouched for him must have power to recall its act; and its function must extend to the prosecution of fraudulent or unwarranted attempts to practise without its official sanction.
The state must therefore provide funds that will enable the board to defend its action in the courts.
A model state board law must therefore guard the following points:
  • the membership of the board must be drawn from the best elements of the profession, including - not, as now, prohibiting - those engaged in teaching;
  • the board must be armed with the authority and machinery to institute practical examinations, to refuse recognition to unfit schools, and to insist upon such preliminary educational standards as the state's own educational system warrants;
  • finally, it must be provided either by appropriation or by greatly increased fees with funds adequate to perform efficiently the functions for which it was created.
The additional powers needed in order to deal as effectively with the practice of medicine, lie outside the present discussion. [italics added]
Flexner lays out more criteria for Regulation/Licensing of the Medical Profession, including a criteria who's implications have not been explored by the Regulators, nor mentioned by ISM/FoSiM: for licenses to have uniform value, they cannot be issued for life, frequent certification retesting is necessary.

If that premise is accepted, then it also demands the Regulation/Licensing process itself cannot be static. It must be continually examined, refreshed and updated with new Knowledge as it becomes available. As has been done for decades in Aviation.
The creation of separate boards is thus a roundabout method of recommitting the errors that the main currents of scientific thinking and effort are endeavoring to remedy.
A single board should subject all candidates, of whatever school, to the same tests at every point.
The license of the state is a guarantee of knowledge, education, and skill.
The layman is in no position to make allowances.
The state's M.D. and the state's D.O. offer themselves for essentially the same purposes.
The state stands equally as guarantor of both.
No citizen can indeed be wholly protected by the state against his own ignorance, fanaticism, or folly.
[referring to a previous comment: men who don't "believe" in doctors can't be forced into treatment]
The state is powerless there.
But having undertaken to vise practising physicians for the protection of those who summon them, it must see to it that the licenses to which it gives currency bear a fairly uniform value. [Italics added]
In conclusion, Flexner talks of Duties, Ethics and the need of the Medical Profession to guard against the corrupting effects of commerce. Exactly the same "Conflict of Interest" message that Arnold Relman and Marcia Angell started writing about in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1980.
Like the army, the police, or the social worker, the medical profession is supported for a benign, not a selfish, for a protective, not an exploiting, purpose.
The knell of the exploiting doctor has been sounded, just as the day of the freebooter and the soldier of fortune has passed away.
It's fitting to end with a quote from Arnold Relman ("A Drumbeat on Profit Takers"):
“It’s clear that if we go on practicing medicine the way we are now, we’re headed for disaster.”
If the things the best and brightest minds in the world of Medical Science are writing, researching and talking about, and have been doing so for 3 decades, are completely different to what ISM/FoSiM started advocating in 2009, then who should we give credence to?

My vote goes to the existing experts who can provide hard-data to back their stories, not mere puffery, exaggeration and "spin" as offered by ISM/FoSiM.

Sunday, July 29, 2012

FoSiM: The local "mini-me" of Institute of Science in Medicine: Same Bull, different faces.

Dr Harriet Hall and her 26 "Founding Fellows" created the "Institute of Science in Medicine" [ISM] in mid-2009 as a "501(c)(3) organization for US federal tax purposes" registered in Colorado.

It self-describes as:
ISM is a non-profit educational organization dedicated to promoting high standards of science in all areas of medicine and public health.
and in PDF files includes:
Institute for Science in Medicine, Inc. (ISM) is an international, educational and public-policy institute, incorporated in the State of Colorado, and recognized as a 501(c)(3) organization for US federal tax purposes.
The local Australian variant, "Friends of Science in Medicine" [FoSiM] self-describes as:
 Our Association was formed at the end of 2011 out of concern about the increasing number of dubious interventions, not supported by credible scientific evidence, now on offer to Australians.
FoSiM was created by Loretta Marron and John Dwyer and three other of their little friends. It took them several months to incorporate an Association in NSW and register a website.  The five "Founders" were necessary under NSW law to form an Association.

Hall and Marron would've known of each other in 2007, both appearing in "The Skeptic" magazine (Australia) and possibly met at a "Skeptics" conference, such as James Randi's TAM7 (The Amazing Meeting) which had a large Australian contingent.

By 2009,  their names appear together in articles, they are both speakers on "The Skeptic Zone" by Richard Saunders and are both closely connection to a number of other high-profile Australian Skeptics like Rachel Dunlop, Kylie Sturgess and Karen Stollznow.

Dr Hall appears in the first list of "Friends", January 2012.

The "mini-me" relationship extends further with their DNS names:

Dr Hall's group has the obvious website name:
www.scienceinmedicine.org
Where the local "mini-me" has a website name unrelated to it registered name, "Friends of Science in Medicine", but exactly congruent with being the local arm of ISM.
www.scienceinmedicine.org.au 
There is a test/development site at:
www.loretta.fosim.org
Why does this matter?

If you read the first policy document of ISM [PDF] as a Declaration of Intent, it finishes with some very worrying 'Recommendations':
NEEDED POLICY
The world’s health care systems need to be rooted in a single, science-based standard of care for all practitioners.
Effective, reliable care can only be delivered by qualified professionals who practice within a consistent framework of scientific knowledge and standards.
Practitioners whose diagnoses, diagnostic methods, and therapies have no plausible basis in the scientific model of medicine should not be licensed by any government, nor should they be allowed to practice under any other regulatory scheme.
Any statute permitting such practices should be amended or repealed as necessary to achieve this policy.
Unscientific practices in health care should further be targets of aggressive prosecution by regulatory authorities.
 This unambiguous Declaration of Intent gives the ISM, and it's mini-me, FoSiM, specific Agenda:
  1. It is an explicit recognition that this is a Political not Academic or Scientific 'debate'. ["As a consequence of these practitioners being legitimized through political rather than scientific means, ...] In no way are either of these bodies "Educational" or "about Science". They are only Political Lobby groups, yet aren't registered as such.
  2. ISM/FoSiM want nothing less than making the practice of "Alternative" Medicines illegal ["change of statues"] and practitioners subject to "aggressive prosecution".
  3. Who will judge what has, and has not, a "plausible basis in the scientific model of medicine"?
    • They don't define either "Science" or it antithesis, "Pseudo-Science", i.e. on the formal, strict basis for this rather extreme decision.
    • They don't suggest a forum in which this 'debate' might occur and the formal bodies that will be charged with these judgements. There is no, and can never be, a Global Council of Science charged with making ultimate decisions of what is/is not "True Science".
    • Nor do ISM/FoSiM suggest whom has adequate qualifications in both Science and Jurisprudence to even suggest answers to these problems, define the Terms of Reference for any Tribunal convened and the training and selection of whom might be selected to sit in Judgement.
    • Do ISM and their "mini-me"s assume that Politicians will have sufficient knowledge, be free from bias and all Conflicts of Interest to sit on these Tribunals?
    • There seems to be no idea of Professions being able to defend themselves on any other grounds but an undefined "scientific model" and seemingly without means of Appeal or cause for Redress.
  4. What isn't spelled out here, but is noted on the FoSiM site, is the assumed Dawkins Appropriation: anything ISM and their "mini-me"s decide is "Medicine" is automatically included in their Field of Practice. Which, by definition, makes that practice or technique now illegal for any other Profession to practice.
Given the extreme published position of ISM and the close alignment of ISM and its "mini-me", FoSiM, comments like this from Australian apologists strike me as ignorant, uninformed or disingenuous in the extreme:
Having an organisation like FSM to kick-start a public debate about the value of science in healthcare is invaluable. 
So to the extent that FSM can get the media and the general public thinking about how much they might value science as opposed to pseudoscience in their healthcare it can only be a good thing. That’s why I stopped sitting on the sidelines of the debate and signed up when I found out about them.
No, this is not a "debate", this is not something of little concern, an effort of well-intentioned, altruistic experts. It is anything but that.

Just to emphasise this is a consistent, reiterated position, a quote from another article:
[From criticism of ISM/FoSiM in the MJA] Indeed, it is not melodramatic to point out that if Friends of Science in Medicine were to succeed in their stated aims, they would achieve a dystopia – a medical ‘1984’ where only one way of knowing the body in health and illness is permitted in public discourse. 
Well, for starters, it IS melodramatic to call FSM dystopian. Allow me to also point out that FSM are not talking about public discourse, they are talking about university training of health professionals. The logic of this argument rests on an assumption that scientific knowledge is not special. 
Again, No so! Read the ISM Policy...

ISM and their clones want any type of Healthcare they declare "not science" to be illegal, and practitioners "aggressively pursued". Once started, this is a very slippery slope. Ultimately, internal Politics reliant on funding and 'connections' will determine what treatments are allowed and which will be deemed "unscientific". The world of Medical Politics is already riven with such extreme dysfunction and violent internecine warfare that few outsiders understand how bad it is.

Are ISM and its clones seriously suggesting the public put their health, and the lives of all their foreseeable descendants, into the hands of an unaccountable, deeply discordant and divided profession with no alternatives whatsoever? That's not going to end well for us, the paying public.

This campaign by ISM is hard-core Political Lobbying by the dominant Healthcare Profession for exclusive control of the domain.

They seem to not be happy with having captured over 99% of the Healthcare Dollar and now want everything, presumably in anticipation of making a grab for a much larger slice of our income. After all, you wouldn't want to die from poor Medical care, would you?

In the USA they've increased National Healthcare Expenditure (NHE) from ~5% in 1960 to ~18% now, with the numbers of uninsured and under-serviced folk steadily increasing, but without any commensurate improvement in the most basic of Healthcare Outcomes: Life Expectancy.
The USA is ranked globally around 80th on that measure, whilst spending 50-100% more of GDP...

Projections on the CMS site include that by 2050, NHE will account for 30% of US GDP. They don't suggest how much higher than the current ~25% the rate of uninsured will be.

Saturday, July 21, 2012

I2P #1: First, Do No Harm.

This is my first post written for "Information to Pharmacists", an interesting Industry Newsletter with a typically idiosyncratic Aussie approach: they welcome authors of any viewpoint and profession, as long as they are respectful to others, not libellous and can write on medical/pharmaceutical issues. And "no dot points, please!" - a challenge for me, leaving behind my favourite organising technique.

Summary:
"Fist, do no Harm" not only embraces Systemic Quality, but better Economic outcomes and improved Efficiency and Effectiveness with reduced waste and Continuous Improvement. Learning and Process Improvement are common to both efforts as are monitoring outcomes: costs, clinical results and "process deviations", a.k.a. "errors".

Computing/I.T. and Medicine share a Fiduciary Duty to their clients, with the Amplifier effects of I.T. now the most cost-effective means of improving Patient Safety, Quality of Care and Treatment Effectiveness.

The enemy of Quality Improvement isn't only "Change Resistance" but faddism, like a cargo-cult adopting the outward signs whilst ignoring the underlying causes and principles.

This, not technical problems, will be the major obstacle to realising the benefits of e-Health initiatives here and overseas. Successful practice transformations have stemmed from Quality Improvement programs with electronic system assisting, not from the blind adoption of automation.


Who am I and what do I have to say that's interesting or useful to Pharmacists and related readers?

I'm a second-generation Computing professional, starting in 1974: in the first group since commercial computers arrived in 1950 to gain undergraduate degrees in Computing. It was still possible to cover in depth the whole field: transistors, hardware, systems, software, operations, business analysis and User Experience.

During a wide-ranging career, I developed an interest in Quality and Turnarounds, for the way out of a mess lies in Working Smarter and stopping wasted effort.
From working in one of the most technically demanding fields, Telco Exchanges where one hour of downtime a year is tolerated, I was imbued with the notion of "Client Service", the same "Fiduciary Duty" that underlies Medicine.
I also discovered for myself the maxim: "Quality isn't just Free, it's cheaper and faster to Do it Right, First Time" defining "Systemic Quality" that, through the work of James T. Reason and Charles Perrow, transformed Aviation after the mid-1970s.

Computers and I.T. are "Cognitive Amplifiers" in the same way that machines are force and skill amplifiers. They allow ordinary folk to easily perform extraordinarily, day after day.

Notionally, automated electronic systems are added to Business Processes to "provide a Business Benefit". Not unlike Marketing, for those Benefits to be realised, they have to be measured  and cannot be measured unless defined and designed in from the start, a practice rarely undertaken.

These ideas have often put me at odds with other technical staff and managers: they are antithetical to the untutored or Default Management Style of business which insists "Just Do It!" is more important than "think before you leap".



Don't all I.T. practitioners suffer the Occupational Hazard of "knowing everything about everything"?

Just about, with the worst offenders often in "Help Desks": everyone else is a fool, which is their experience from on-going "idiot user" calls.
This is a trap that I consciously try to avoid: any reminders from readers are welcomed.

Automated computing/I.T. systems cut across every part of an Organisation, often extending into other Organisations in ways few appreciate. No other Profession does this, not even management and accounting, requiring Business Analysts and Programmers to understand the work of other Professions better than they know themselves.

Programs and Systems are crystallised thought processes: they are exact, detailed, and hopefully complete, descriptions of the cognitive processes people use to execute tasks.
Often the hardest part of this work is uncovering Implicit Knowledge and converging on correct task definitions that will become universal for the first time.
Politics always trumps the Technical in this work, creating inconsistencies and contradictions in tasks.

To be good at Computing/I.T., you need to be both a 'quick study' of other Fields of Practice and be able to apply a raft of tools allowing you to understand their work better than they do.

Which often leads to a certain arrogance and hubris. It takes some humility and courage to admit that true Domain Experts have great talent and skill: Experts make their work look effortless and obvious, as seen in performances of sporting stars.

The irony is that the best Computing/I.T. experts have the same problem with 'management' and business owners: What they do looks simple and obvious to outsiders and is undervalued.

For completeness, many I.T. practitioners are not expert in this way. They make the job look hard, with the resulting systems being slow, difficult to use and wrong or buggy: for which they often get promoted for their "heroic efforts" slaying the Project Beast.


I.T. is fine, as long as it stays out of my way...

If this is you after too many fads, management or I.T., being foisted on you without consultation or thought for local consequences, you have my condolences and understanding.

I absorbed the many fads in the first 15 years of my career before wondering why nothing really changed and digging back into history. Fredrick W. Taylor and Henri Fayol wrote comprehensively about Management and Quality Improvement more than a century ago with Dr W Edwards Deming adding a definitive theoretical base sixty years ago.
Why then, did Michael Hammer re-invent, badly, the work of Taylor et al in the 1990's, then need to resile from it a decade later?

The Japanese transformed their Industrial processes this way, taking 3 decades to out compete the USA in making cars. During the 1990's, the US experienced fads of "the Japanese Way", but generally never understood or adopted Deming's core principles.
Then the "outsourcing" and "right sizing" fads took over with messy manufacturing being sent off-shore, becoming "Someone Else's Problem".


Systemic Quality: tying it all together.

Aviation proves three things about Systemic Quality: it can be achieved every day with ordinary people, it's the most cost-effective approach available and arises from a pervasive Safety Culture supported from the very top down.

There are some notable efforts to bring Systemic Quality to Medicine/Healthcare: Intermountain Healthcare with Dr Brent James, trained by Dr Deming, being responsible for 20 years of Quality Improvement, "Safety Leaders" website from Texas Medical Institute of Technology, National Academy of Science's Institute of Medicine and Donald Berwick's Institute for Healthcare Improvement.

Not only do they have hard data on their Cost, Safety and Error outcomes, they can show that it's 20-30% cheaper for them to Do it Right, First Time.


And for Pharmacists... You're important.

In the interview Dr James gave to Norman Swan in 2001, "Minimising Harm to Patients in Hospital", he said they used their Drug Information Systems to identify many Adverse Events, such as an opiate overdose requiring 'narcan' to be administered.

They also found these system-related Adverse Events 30-times more prevalent than reported Human Errors. Dr James said:

For ten consecutive years we tracked every adverse drug event and in parallel with that we tracked classic human errors. In ten years we had 4,155 confirmed human errors. In parallel with that we had 3,996 confirmed moderate or severe adverse drug events.
Norman Swan: In other words, what was actually happening to the patient him or herself?
Injuries. Those were injuries, those 3,996. The fascinating thing was the overlap. Among 3,996 confirmed injuries, 138 or 3.5% resulted because of a human error.
Norman Swan: So in other words most of the human errors didn't result in an injury.


Monday, July 2, 2012

Failed Professions: Definition, Impact, Consequences

[Full post on other blog.]

I'd like to assert that (Australian) Medicine, Banking and Finance & Investment Advisors and Information Technology (I.T.) are Failed Professions.

The fields of Management and Politics, whilst notable for their egregious actions and errors and not just failing expectations of good governance, but actively harming or exploiting the general public, are not Professions: they fail the basic tests of "Body of Knowledge" and "Entrance Requirements".

What do I mean by a "Failed Profession"?
How do I support that view?
I've posited a Theory of Professions to support this view.

Particularly, the level of Duty practitioners, organisations and the Profession owe towards their clients and their Community.

Of my list, Medicine and Banking/Finance/Investment-Advisors Professions, have the highest level of Duty towards their patients and clients: a Fiduciary Trust or Duty.

They are required to always put the concerns and welfare of their clients/patients before all else, particularly ahead of their own interests (especially pecuniary), ahead of their colleagues, employer and organisation and ahead of their Profession.

A first attempt at Medicine as a Failed Profession.

Aviation: A model for what can be done

Aviation is not Perfect, but it is the closest thing we have to it.

It shows that whole Industries, on a global scale, can embrace Quality Improvement and Safety programs whilst still being Profitable and advancing new technologies.

It's a culture and mindset and a willingness to admit weakness and error as a first step to correcting them.

Aviation succinctly answers the Professional Question:
When is it acceptable for a Professional to repeat, or allow, a Known Error, Fault or Failure?
Never...
When, not if, they are discovered, individuals and organisations will be held to account and suffer direct, personal consequences.
So why are other Professions allowed to practice outside this minimum standard?

Monday, June 25, 2012

An answer: Why not an NTSB for Healthcare? II

Continuing this topic: In the seminal Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, "An NTSB for Healthcare", a central question is posed:
Not Why an NTSB for Healthcare ... Why Not?
Medical Healthcare is often compared to Aviation on Quality of Care and Patient Safety, but the comparison is wrong and ineffectual: the story is poor and we're not yet ready to hear the message.

We, as travellers, wouldn't step onto any airplane if Safety and Quality were as variable and haphazard as Medical Healthcare in Hospitals, Primary Care Physicians, Specialists and other facilities.

So why, as individuals and a society, do we accept, seemingly without comment, 1000-fold worse Safety from Medical Healthcare than Aviation?

There are no "smoking craters", nor any vision/images for the media to build a story upon.
There is no big story for the six o'clock News, no individuals' story is 'newsworthy' enough.
"If it bleeds, it leads" cuts both ways...

Describing 100,000 "preventable deaths" from Medical Error/year as equivalent to "10 planes crashing per week" is numerically correct, but an invalid comparison.

Patients don't die all together, they die slowly, not instantly and they are widely scattered - there is a very low density of Medical Error on a daily basis. Each death, although tragic, is invisible.

Medical Error, or "preventable harm", is the leading single cause of death in US Hospitals and seems to be heading in the wrong direction. Which, because Medical Healthcare is a universal, not optional, service, should be causing concern and outrage, instead it goes unremarked and unnoticed in the Media and hence with the General Public.

The more subtle cause is: Preventable Deaths and Serious Injury from Medical Error as not centrally collated and reported.
Even the more complex story, the decline in Medical Quality of Care and Patient Safety, cannot be told because there are no data.

Because deaths and serious injury from Medical Error is so frequent, common and widespread, only the most egregious and sad are reported, like the 2010 preventable and foreseeable injury to Grace Wang, a young first-time mother who was paralysed in Sydney, NSW, through a repeat of a well known Error.

While tragic for the family and friends of victims, those individual stories have no "news value" outside direct acquaintances.
Plus, the sheer volume of individual stories means a cut-off is needed. The time taken to just read 2,000 names every week would be hours and hours of "dead time".

Should then Media report the statistics?
No, as even Stalin knew: A Single Death is a Tragedy; a Million Deaths is a Statistic.

We are our own worst enemies as a society, when we need to address endemic problems:
  • Without "something out of the ordinary", stories have no "news value".
  • We suffer boredom and "compassion fatigue" from long running stories, no matter how terrible.
  • Statistics are not personal, there is no emotional connection, hence little "news value".
  • Nobody is forcing Medical Healthcare to report and categorise 100% of Medical Errors. This removes the possibility of even a larger, investigative story.
Chip and Dan Heath, in "Made to Stick", Why some ideas survive and others die, layout a formula for successful story-telling, or getting ideas to resonate and spread:
  • Simple
    • Makes the story accessible.
  • Unexpected
    • Makes people pay attention.
  • Concrete
    • Makes people understand and remember.
  • Credible
    • Makes people agree and believe.
  • Emotional
    • Makes people care.
  • Stories
    • Be able to act upon it
    • A story's power is twofold: It provides stimulation (Knowledge) and inspiration (motivation to act). Both benefits are geared to generating action.
That these are very hard to do altogether is shown by how few "urban myths" there really are and how little we each retain in detail from the nightly news.

What the estimable brothers Heath don't make much of is a zeroth requirement:
There is nothing more powerful than an idea whose time has come, and
there is nothing less interesting than idea before its time.
The efforts being made to report and address the epidemic of Medical Healthcare Error are earnest, "real", well-crafted and creative. In another time they'd succeed, wildly.

The Public, and hence Politicians and legislators/regulators, are not yet ready to hear this message.
Perhaps we'll hit a tipping point when Healthcare either becomes generally unaffordable or 30% of people are directly affected by serious Medical Harm.

Until then, I hope those fighting this Good Fight can keep their spirits up and continue in the face of disinterest.

Sunday, June 24, 2012

An answer: Why not an NTSB for Healthcare?

In the seminal  Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, "An NTSB for Healthcare", a central question is posed:
Not Why an NTSB for Healthcare ... Why Not?
We believe that the question regarding an NTSB for healthcare is not why...but why not!
  • Why not use best practices that taxpayers have already paid for to prevent the more than 30 preventable deaths an hour in American hospitals?
  • Why not use methods that have been field-tested with proven results?
  • Why not save money while saving lives and bringing value to our communities?
  • Why not leverage great tools from aviation that clearly have application to healthcare?
  • Why not challenge common risk-management processes to prevent the national sharing of information?
  • Since current databases of healthcare accidents are so small, sparsely populated, and inaccessible to all hospitals, why not have a fast-track program generating "Red Cover Reports?"
  • Why not address the Health Information Technology (HIT) risks proactively, as we know unintended consequences occur when we introduce new technologies?
  • Why not learn the lesson from aviation – that we must move beyond reporting causes and aggressively move to prevention of accidents?
  • Why not give high net worth individuals like Warren Buffet who feel that tax rates are too low an opportunity to provide funds to create an NTSB-like demonstration project and prove what we already know and save lives in the process?
  • In a new report from the IOM HIT and Patient Safety; Safer Systems for better care, a committee of independent experts has called for an NTSB like body to investigate serious problems related to HIT – why not listen to them?
The Safety Leaders site has more great material than you can believe - its carefully selected, well structured and crafted; and finely targeted to various interest groups. It doesn't rely on assertion and dogma, but forceful and compelling hard-evidence from Healthcare and other high risk fields.

Watching the truly outstanding series, probably from 2010 and onwards, "Surfing the Tsunami", there's a panel discussing the IOM report  "an NTSB for Healthcare".

Where they note they didn't phrase the central question as "we need to do this", but "Why not do this?"
They are truly perplexed by the lack of take-up and enquire of the audience, "Why Not?"

In "An unnoticed crisis in Healthcare", I posit a systems effect based on "thrashing" that, whilst a very well know computing problem, is almost unknown outside.
In response to "Why not an NTSB for Healthcare", answers come from Change Management with insight form Human Behaviour and Organisational Dynamics.

The primary answer is:
  • What's in it for me?
    • What's the upside of doing this, of changing how I work?
and the concomitant:
  • Are there consequences for not doing this?
    • What's the downside of ignoring or not doing this, or continuing "Business as Usual"?
Without changing the rewards and penalty structure, there not only won't will be, there can not be any systemic change.
"There is no reason we can't do that in Healthcare"

The Organisation Dynamics driver to purse is mundane but pervasive:
  • Follow the Money!
    • Power, Influence and the ability to demand compliance or "say NO and make it stick" all track back to power over budget or positional power: Status is a proxy for pay-scale. We award high Status employees with money and, for principals and owners, individual and organisational Status determine the ability to attract paying customers and set billable rates.
The first answer to the most of the "Why not" questions, the practitioner, manager and Board answer is simple:
  • Why not? Because we don't have to.
A more insidious, subtle and ultimately deciding, not even pivotal, factor to consider is:
What are the blocks, active and passive, to change?
Reframing this question:
  • Who has the most to win or lose from maintaining the current Status Quo?
  • Who are the gatekeepers, individual, organisational and political, that can either enforce the current Status Quo, or prevent/limit change?
Again, the answers come down to self-interest and pecuniary interests.

My perception of the absolute blockers of this Change Programme are:
  • A pervasive "Medical Culture" of roughly:
    • The "Doctor as God": all others within the System must bow to them, to accept their unquestioned authority.
    • Doctors are Kings of their own Domain, with an inherent right to unquestioned authority and self-determination within their sphere of control.
    • Like Lords and fiefdoms of the Dark Ages, Lords do not interfere with, on comment on, the affairs in any other Domain, but still pay homage to those above them in the hierarchy.
    • "Doctors don't make Mistakes, just encounter 'difficult cases'".
  • The Medical suppliers, Big Pharma and services industries that do very nicely right now and have the inalienable commercial right to fight to retain that.
  • The all too many current Medicos in the "top 5%", and everyone with the ambition to join them.
  • The Hospital Administrators and Board Members who get paid based on how things are now.
  • The AMA, American Medical Association:
    • Is it an employee Trade Union, a Sole Practitioner or Small Business Association, a Business Owner Association or Medical Trade Association, or all of those?
    • How does it fulfil the primary role of a Professional Body in disseminating Knowledge and Current Practice, both What Works and What Doesn't?
    • How does it fulfil its Fiduciary Duty to Societal Groups that need representation and protection, but don't have the influence, knowledge or resources to make themselves heard?
    • When lobbying Government and Regulators, how does it resolve the inherent conflict of interest between "standing up for members interests" and its Fiduciary Duty to individuals and the Society its serves?
    • Does the AMA, through its elected officials, have a consistent, clear overarching vision of Serving the Public, or something else that allows savage internecine Politics and viscous wars within and without the Profession?
Clearly, the AMA is critical to the acceptance and implementation of a radical change in not just how Healthcare is delivered in the USA, but the Medical Culture and system of payments. Is it likely to recognise, let alone address, that it has inherent conflicts of interests at its core? Without acknowledging who it is and what it does, the organisation cannot change.

The obvious most effective Political change needed is in Funding.

To stop rewarding behaviours and practices that are dysfunctional or not supportive of Societal goals and to start rewarding those things that fix the system, that address known problems. The O'bama administration has attempted to change the Healthcare system, but with extreme opposition from 'conservative' interests. It is unclear that anything will be accomplished from this initiative.

To underline this point, consider the insights in, and impact of, the seminal article by IHI CEO, Don Berwick, over 15 years ago:

Berwick D. A primer on leading the improvement of systems. BMJ 1996;

Good systems are designed deliberately to produce high quality work.
By eliminating waste, delay and the need to redo substandard work, they achieve long-term cost effectiveness." 
The Central Law of Improvement: every system is perfectly designed to achieve the results it achieves
What has changed since 1996? Was there a revolution?
Quality Improvement is still an outlier activity. Medical Healthcare continues to kill and maim more people each year without seemingly garnering attention or comment. The "Doctor as God" Medical Culture continues unabated and new entrants are sill inculcated into it.

But the worst thing of all, the cost of Medical Healthcare, in absolute and relative terms, continues to rise unchecked. This is perhaps the greatest threat in 100 years to American Democracy and Sovereignty. Nobody "in Power" within the Roman Empire saw the end coming, the inexorable march of competitors into their heartlands. Nor did those "in Power" in the USSR and Eastern Block seem to notice or prepare for the acute disruption of their system following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990.

This is the shape of these disruptive "step" changes: Nobody inside seems them coming.

The AMA is the primary gatekeeper to Medical Healthcare in the USA: it has the resources and ability to block any and all changes. At some point, there will be a showdown: the current Status Quo versus Change and Improvement.

There is another important difference between Aviation and Healthcare than must be addressed before there can be any systemic changes in the US Medical Healthcare system:
There are very few personal consequences of "poor performance" or "failures" for Doctors.
Pilots, operations and maintenance staff and Organisations face real, immediate penalties when they are discovered to have repeated, or allowed, Known Errors, Faults or Failures.

Pilots, unlike Doctors, face immediate, dire personal consequences when they catastrophically fail in their mission: they die.

Fear of death "focuses the mind". No pilot ever did less than their best when attempting to avoid a crash.

For those that have listened to the voice-cockpit recordings of Capt. Chesley Sullenberger in the 208 seconds it took Flight 1549 to end up in the Hudson river, his very calm, focussed and steady state seems to contradict any acute stress reaction as he faced imminent death, "mission failure" and the responsibility for the lives of everyone "back there".

Capt. Sullenberger suffered an actue, on-going stress reaction to those 208 seconds. For nearly three months afterwards he had significantly elevated heart-rate and blood-pressure. The immediate aftermath, of the first fatality free ditching of a jet-liner - an outstanding success, was that he couldn't sleep for at least a week. He did not return to the flight-deck of commercial aircraft after he recovered, thought I believe the First Officer did. This is not uncommon amongst anyone in Aviation who feels responsible for a fatal accident, not just pilots.

Pilots not only care about the outcomes (safe passage) for those whom entrust their lives to them, they put their own lives on the line.

Doctors may care for their patients' outcomes, but don't have "skin in the game" in nearly the same way. Their motivation to reduce adverse patient outcomes is infinitesimal when compared to pilots.

So the answer has to be simple: let Doctors suffer dire personal consequences for their failures.

Only that is the worst possible action, as Dr Brent James pointed out to me, this would guarantee perverse outcomes and worse quality of care.
People optimise what is measured, a well known management principle.
As soon as the organisation measure Errors, Faults and Failures, and assigns individual blame, rational people (Doctors included) will modify their behaviour to avoid any censure: they'll devote the majority of their resources to CYA (Cover Your Arse).

Not only is a fundamental shift in the funding model of US Medical Healthcare required to create improved Quality of Care, real change is needed in the rewards and penalty structure:
  • Failure to promptly report "Adverse Event Incidents" by any Medical Staff must lead to Professional penalties.
  • Prompt personal reporting of real or potential "Errors, Faults and Failures" must be protected, to have no Professional or Personal consequence beyond retraining or reassignment.
  • Medical Error litigation against employed individuals must be banned, with only Organisations being held responsible and able to be sued.
    • The high-cost of "Professional Indemnity Insurance" has to be addressed.
    • Organisations and individual Medical Professionals need to be able speak to families and victims of Medical Errors openly and fully without concern for legal liabilities.
  • On-going care for, or compensation of, Medical Error victims and their families has to be automatic, fixed and reasonable. Awards are not windfalls of the legal lottery, nor an encouragement for the legal system.
    • A significant step forward must be removing the incentives for legal practices to pursue Medical Error litigation.
  • Hospital Administrators and to a lesser extent, Board Members, have to assume direct, personal liability for Patient Care outcomes.
    • This requires a legislative change.
    • Most importantly, the legal basis of evidence needs to be altered
      • This is not about single individuals, but the aggregate Quality of Care and Patient Safety delivered across all patients within a system.
      • People can be barred as Directors of Companies for poor behaviour, so should those in Positions of Trust within Medical Healthcare.
  • Collection and full public reporting of Patient Safety data is critical.
    • Falsifying, interfering with or manipulating Patient Safety data should be a severe criminal offence.
  • Public Root Causes Analyses of all fatalities and severely harmful Medical Errors need to be conducted and published within 'reasonable' timeframes by independent, properly resourced and trained experts.
    • Civil and Criminal charges must be possible against:
      • anyone repeating a Known Error, Fault of Failure.
      • anyone charged with preventing Known Errors etc from failing to do so.
      • Any and all owners and managers who fail in their Duty to Prevent Harm.
      • Organisations and managers/office bearers within them that fail to disseminate Harm Prevention information and processes/procedures in an effective and timely manner.
      • "Wilful Blindness" provisions are needed as well. Practitioners, Administrators and Owners/Managers that do not actively pursue Quality Improvement or Knowledge dissemination are culpable through an act of omission.
  • New Criminal Offences for Medical Practitioners are needed on the statue books:
    • intention to Harm, (ie. deliberate malfeasance) and
    • Professional Negligence demonstrated by persistently low Quality of Care indices or excessive Patient Safety violations.
As a community, there has to be consensus support and a willingness to hold all Medical Professionals to the basic Professional standard:
  • There is never an reason for a Professional to repeat, or allow, Known Errors, Faults and Failures.
Until the community embraces this as a minimum standard, nothing can change.

While this happens, all the incumbents that profit from maintaing the Status Quo will remain as active, vocal and trenchant Roadblocks to Change.

The path to "an NTSB for Healthcare" lies through Politics and a broad social demand for change, not empty promises and window dressing.

Thursday, June 21, 2012

A Theory of Professions

[Full post on other blog.]

Here I attempt to lay out a Theory of Professions that can be used to guide and inform practitioners, Professional Bodies, Regulators, Governments and the general Public.

The original contribution here is an attempt to layout a framework to categorise Professions by their Duty to Others and suggest that these duties apply at multiple levels: Practitioners, Organisations, Whole Profession.

Wednesday, June 13, 2012

On Being a Professional: 3 Axions. Right Reasons, Attitude, Aptitude.

[Full post on other blog.]

I've stated for a time my rubric of Professional Practice as a rhetorical question:
When it is ever acceptable for a Professional to repeat, or allow, a Known Fault, Failure or Error? [A: Never]
Some larger questions arise but won't be dealt with here, but they imply a meta-level, the "Profession":
  • Define 'Known' (which needs a means of transmission), and
  • What are, or should be, the Consequences of unprofessional conduct or performance?
Healthcare, Medicine and the Learned Professions (eg. Law) have a special (higher) onus of responsibility on them. In the scale of Professional Duty, they are the most stringent and demanding:
  • Fiduciary Duty or Trust:
    •  "involving trust, esp. with regard to the relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary" [Oxford American Writer's Thesaurus]
  • Fair Go, Fair Treatment.
  • No Rules, Buyer Beware.
I'm positing three axions of Professional Practitioners, especially those with a Fiduciary Duty to their clients:
  • Clean Motivation of Entry into and Practice in the Discipline: not Money, not Status, not Power/Prestige/Influence.
  • Continuous Active Learning and Improvement.
  • A trusting and safe environment, "The fundamental Clinical Requirement", for the patient to "open up" into a full, frank and unstinting clinical communication.
Lastly, there's the matter of Talent.

Some people are gifted in a field and given the same degree of training and practice, outperform us "mere mortals" by many times. Some might say "orders of magnitude".

The proof is Elite Athletes and Professional Sports. Talent counts, not just perseverance, determination and desire. Talent counts as much in the clinical setting as on the sports field - and the results are similarly different.

Professions don't do themselves favours by allowing those of limited Talent to practice.
It diminishes the field and fails the patients.

Ironically, through the Dunning-Kruger effect (tone-deaf performers self-assess as virtuosos), this can institutionalise perverse selection and assessment regimes:
   when the professors are tone-deaf, they reward those like themselves and remove all others.

Exemplified by the claim: "I'm the Best XXX in the South-West/North/Area/City/State/..."
It's an error of logic of the kind: "compared to what? by whom?"

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

Egoless Practice: Becoming the Best in your Field

[Full post on other blog.]

Jerry Weinberg coined the term, "egoless programming" in his 1971 book "Psychology of Computer Programming". Jerry describes the practice and mindset, and in 1977 co-wrote with Friedman, the definitive manual for practitioners:  "Handbook of Walkthroughs, Inspections, and Technical Reviews: Evaluating Programs, Projects, and Products".

Is there a precise definition of "egoless programming" that could be expanded to a generic Professional Behaviour of "egoless practice"?

Johana Rothman is quoted by Jeff Atwood, presumably from a book, as saying:
Egoless programming occurs when a technical peer group uses frequent and often peer reviews to find defects in software under development. The objective is for everyone to find defects, including the author, not to prove the work product has no defects. [my italics]
When asked for a modern definition, Jerry pointed at Jeff's Ten Commandments of Egoless Programming.

The field of Reliability Engineering is aimed at creating near-Perfect (i.e. highly reliable) operation from imperfect parts and sub-systems. This approach can work very well, even when maintenance and fixes can't be done: the NASA Mars Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, exceeded their 90-day design life by around 15 times, working from 2004-2010.

A working definition (unfortunately, of many parts).

Egoless Practice is:
  • a Professional Behaviour
  • designed to 
  • routinely and reliably achieve
  • as Perfect as Possible outcomes
  • for the Client or Service Recipient
  • by knowledgable and skilful
  • Practitioners
  • supported by systems, processes and procedures
  • that actively monitor, examine and report performances,
  • for both failures and successes,
  • to systematically and without-backsliding improve 
  • Quality, Performance and Process
  • of Individuals, Teams and Organisations.
To Err is Human isn't a syllogism, it is an Iron-Clad Law.

It's the basis of the unending, relentless Professional Challenge:
  • we're not machines,
  • we cannot ever exactly repeat a process, not even twice, let alone the many times every day needed in Professional Practice, and
  • our Minds and Bodies are always letting us down or tricking us in some way.
Simply stated: We are constantly making mistakes, inadvertently or not.

Sunday, March 25, 2012

Systemic Quality and "The Iron Triangle" of Quality, Cost and Schedule.

[Full post on other blog.]

The work on Safety and Quality systems by James T. Reason and Charles H. Perrow redefined the world of Quality, showing up in acceleration Safety in Aviation post-1970.

But what do you call this approach?

I'd like to suggest, "Systemic Quality".

Perrow called them "Normal Accidents" and Reason "Organisational Accidents". Both were talking about System created Accidents. Where multiple events, not individuals, are the cause of unintended poor outcomes. But neither coined a term for this approach to Safety and Quality.
My reasoning for the naming is:
Name the approach after the cause addressed, Systems create the problems, so it's Systemic Quality.
The text below is adapted from a piece on suggesting Medicine become a Modern Profession, like Aviation.

What Dr W. Edwards Deming understood so well is that Quality, Process Improvement and Performance Improvement are linked through the same fundamental:
Deliberate, focussed review of work outcomes with intentional Learning and Adaption are necessary for, and common to, all three.
This is enshrined in Deming's P-D-S-A (Plan-Do-Study-Act) cycle, which he called the Shewhart Cycle.

Systemic Quality through its design and nature improves Safety, Performance/Productivity and Economic Performance/Profitability.
Something that Apple Inc knows and Microsoft, the long-time market leader, does not.

Thursday, March 8, 2012

Australian Medicine as a Failed Profession. #1

Australian Doctors practice medicine as if it was a cottage-industry craft supported by a 'Guild', not as a modern, accountable Profession practised for the Public Good.

Guilds limit new entrants, protect and control 'the secret craft knowledge' and vigorously defend their turf. A monopoly on the practice designed for restraint-of-trade, not the benefit of clients nor the community.

Proof:

  • We are entering the second decade of the doctor and specialist shortage here. Australia has more than enough resources to be producing a surplus and exporting to the world the best doctors around, like the Scottish once did for 'Engineers'.
    • How can there be a shortage? It's not because its not needed nor not possible here.
    • Why aren't doctors picketing every Parliament in the land on behalf of their patients and the wider community? Letting known dangerous conditions for patients and doctors continue is neither Ethical nor Professional behaviour.
  • It's now more than a decade since "Minimising Harm to Patients" was broadcast here and the US Institute of Medicine released "To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System" yet the critical first steps, gathering hard data, are not being practiced in Australia. Real Change can only be based on hard data, not abstract or distant  'scientific evidence'.
    • Dr Brent James showed with hard data, not statistical inference or speculation, that Patient Injuries (unintended results of "system errors") were 80 times (eighty!) more prevalent than Adverse Events (due to human error or omission). Sentinel Events are a subset of Adverse Events that are undeniable and result in catastrophic outcomes for the patient.
    • Where's the hard-data from Hospitals and GP's on one of their most critical Performance Indicators: Patient Injuries?
    • The Profession can't claim ignorance of these results nor their irrelevance. So why haven't doctors and their Professional Associations been very strong activists for this necessary reform?
    • One of the surprise results of Dr James work, again backed with the strongest proof, was "it's at least 20% cheaper to Do it Right, First Time". Why aren't Australian Doctors overwhelmingly lobbying all Parliaments for this reform, especially in Hospital systems?
  • Five plus years on from "Dr. Death" in Bundaberg, is anything different? Is there any excuse for that?
    • The Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Health (QH) determine just one of the root causes was the inability of QH to retain locally trained doctors. Why hasn't that been remedied? As a major, critical Public Health issue, why aren't doctors and their associations taking the strongest actions industrially and politically with both State and Federal Parliament to rectify this on behalf of those in their care?
    • Could Jayant Patel happen again? It seems, "yes". Could he be hired again, allowed to practice in the same way, poor patient outcomes go unnoticed and unremarked, and the nursing staff who raising the alarm be comprehensively ignored and worse? After five years there is no public evidence that QH has addressed these issues, and yet the doctors and their associations remain quiet and action-free. Why the lack of activism and public action? Why is the Medical Profession silent on this issue? [And if the answer is a provable "No" as against "trust us, we've changed", why isn't that known?]
    • In most states, Jayant Patel's deliberate harming of patients is not a crime. Where is the outcry and outrage from the Medical Profession? After more than 5 years, the absence of any concerted efforts by doctors and their associations to have this oversight corrected is not accidental. This non-action is now deliberate. Why are doctors and their associations not advocating for the strongest, most reasonable protections possible for their patients?
    • Jayant Patel was only charged for a very small proportion of his injuries and deaths because of an antiquated legal notion, direct causality. We know that Patel killed, maimed and injured many times the number the DPP was able to charge him with. The statistics on his trail of carnage are unassailable, yet no legislative changes have been made or proposed. In one of the Engineering Professions, evidence like this would cause a practitioner to lose their license to practise and might be accepted as evidence in criminal proceedings. [I don't have legal advise on that]. Why is the Medical Profession silent on this issue when statistical analyses are at the very heart of their holy-of-holies Standard of Evidence, Randomised Controlled Trials (a.k.a. Placebo controlled double-blind randomised experiments)?

What does a modern Profession look like?
Aviation as a perfect model.

A short excursion into theory:
 In Project Management, there is the "Iron Triangle", explained as "Good, Fast, Cheap: pick any two".
[Alternatively, the "Iron Triangle" comprises: scope, schedule and cost constraints with no explicit mention of Emergent Dimensions like Safety and Quality.]

This piece of received wisdom says that Economic Profitability, Job Performance and Product/Process Quality are competing dimensions, to optimise one of them, others have to be sacrificed.

This just isn't so.

It only appears that way if a) you examine a single project (in the short-run) and b) your Project Methodology doesn't include the last half of Demings' cycle (Plan - Do - Review - Act to improve system).

Dr Deming's proven Quality Theories rely on two fundamentals which you might recognise from the Scientific Method:
  • Be inquisitive, examine your own performance, look for insights into your work and outcomes, self-examination is the precursor to insight, and
  • try to constantly improve both your knowledge and practice, to consciously learn both from your failures and successes.
This "conscious, deliberate learning" mindset is a necessary condition for constant improvement in all three aspects of the Iron Triangle: Profitability, Performance and Quality.

It's a long-run, not short-run, effect. It doesn't appear within a single project, but after the execution of many. The most important part of every project is the Analysis/Learning phase after it, the Project Review.

For cottage-industry crafts, where you only practice "as learnt" skills without deliberate improvement or correction, the veracity of the "Pick any two" ideology is both obvious and unbreakable.

For modern Professions practising "Do it Right, First Time", the saying is trite and wrong.

Back to Aviation, a modern Profession where, in most but not all countries, "Do it Right, First Time" is pervasive and firmly embedded in the culture and practice of each discipline and speciality, as well as in the governance of the whole Industry and its component parts.

More importantly, there is free, public data on the performance of the Industry.

Page 11 of the EASA's 2010 Annual Safety Review, has a powerful chart [Fig 2-1] showing how the Industry has progressed/improved and some words that should make the Australian Medical Profession both ashamed and envious:

The data in Figure 2-1 show that the safety of aviation has improved from 1945 onwards. Based on the measure of passenger fatalities per 100 million passenger miles flown, it took some 20 years (1948 to 1968) to achieve the first 10-fold improvement from 5 to 0.5. Another 10-fold improvement was reached in 1997, almost 30 years later, when the rate had dropped below 0.05. For the year 2010 this rate is estimated1 to have stayed at 0.01 fatalities per 100 million miles flown.

The accident rate in this figure appears to have been flat over recent years. This is the result of the scale used to reflect the high rates in the late 1940s.
Another Canadian resource site, with an inspiring graph on the improvement in Aviation Safety says:
Up to the early 1970s the number of fatalities increased with some proportionality with the growth of air traffic. By the 1970s, in spite of substantial growth levels of air traffic, fatalities undertook a downward trend. This is jointly the outcome of better aircraft designs, better navigation and control systems as well as comprehensive accident management aiming at identifying the causes and then possible mitigation strategies.
This isn't isolated or peculiarly European: 
The reason for these massive, on-going improvements is the detail and seriousness of incident investigations. Notably, while commercial "Air Carriers" have improved their Safety and Operations by several orders of magnitude while being profitable in a cut-throat industry experiencing a 1,000-fold increase in services delivered, "General Aviation" has improved, but by only approximately 5-fold.
The difference isn't in the technology, training available or processes/procedures detailed. It's the Professional "Right First Time, Every Time" approach.

The crash in early 2009 into the Hudson River of US Airways 1549, piloted by  Capt. "Sully" Sullenberger, was dramatic, widely reported, and resulted in no fatalities and only a handful of injuries.
Yet it led to 35 "Recommendations" by the US official investigator, the NTSB (National Transport Safety Board). Think how different this is to Australian Medical practice: even injuries resulting in permanent disabling of patients, like the 2010 preventable and foreseeable injury to Grace Wang, a repeat of prior Errors, led to news reports, but no obvious investigation and certainly no consequences for anyone involved.

These NTSB "recommendations" will be implemented, will be checked upon by a regulatory body [the FAA] and failure to do so will result in proportional, direct, personal and organisational consequences.

This is completely at odds to the 550+ page report by the 2005 Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry, triggered by Jayant Patel and others, where the Recommendations are optional, their (timely) implementation won't be checked, nor will there be consequences for anyone repeating these Known Errors, Faults and Failures.

One of the reasons for this cultural change in Aviation and resulting the on-going improvement of Safety, Quality and Performance in Aviation is the theoretical work of two men:
NASA uses Perrow [PDF] as a basis for its Safety programmes.

Prof. Reason seems to have retired from Academe, but is still listed as an advisor to "The Texas Medical Institute of Technology (TMIT)".

James Reason's work is well known in the medical community: it was used by Dr Brent James and colleagues in the remarkable turnaround and improvement of Intermountain Healthcare, reported in "Minimising Harm to Patients".
On the wikipedia page on "The Swiss Cheese Model", a large number of pieces in "Further Reading" are medical.

Where this ends is a 2012 article published in "Journal of Patient Safety", available on the TMIT site, "An NTSB for Healthcare, Learning from Innovation: Debate and Innovate or Capitulate", where the authors, Medicos and Aviators and authors of 100 medical papers, call for applying what is known to work in Aviation to Medicine.

An idea that seems long overdue, although they don't go as far as suggesting the second, necessary, pillar of the Aviation system, the US FAA or UK's CAA, a regulatory and compliance organisation (also responsible for provision of common services, like Air Traffic Control). These organisations are charged with first implementing and on-going checking of NTSB recommendations, bringing direct, personal consequences to those not complying.

Without "accountability", recommendations and findings have little likelihood of being fully and consistently practised.

Abstract:
Economic and medical risks threaten the national security of America.
The spiraling costs of United States' avoidable healthcare harm and waste far exceed those of any other nation. 
This 2-part paper, written by a group of aviators, is a national call to action to adopt readily available and transferable safety innovations we have already paid for that have made the airline industry one of the safest in the world.
This first part supports the debate for a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) for health care, and the second supports more cross-over adoption by hospitals of methods pioneered in aviation. 
A review of aviation and healthcare leadership best practices and technologies was undertaken through literature review, reporting body research, and interviews of experts in the field of aviation principles applied to medicine.
An aviation cross-over inventory and consensus process led to a call for action to address the current crisis of healthcare waste and harm. 
The NTSB, an independent agency established by the United States Congress, was developed to investigate all significant transportation accidents to prevent recurrence.
Certain NTSB publications known as "Blue Cover Reports" used by pilots and airlines to drive safety provide a model that could be emulated for hospital accidents.
An NTSB-type organization for health care could greatly improve healthcare safety at low cost and great benefit.
A "Red Cover Report" for health care could save lives, save money, and bring value to communities. 
A call to action is made in this first paper to debate this opportunity for an NTSB for health care.
A second follow-on paper is a call to action of healthcare suppliers, providers, and purchasers to reinvigorate their adoption of aviation best practices as the market transitions from a fragmented provider-volume-centered to an integrated patient-value-centered world.